How this case got to Federal Court when it should have went [straight] to State Court (being a dispute in property ownership), Is all a result of Yaakov Spritzer and Friends (Spritzer, Meir Schreiber and Yossi Spalter) trying to have fellow Jews locked up with a Viscous Mesira. [If Spritzer would have started this case in state court, the issue would have been resolved almost immediately (the verdict, that all are rightful directors), Spritzer knowing this, comes up with a plan of Mesira, to force the camp away from it’s rightful owners, as you see].
For those who excuse themselves (and send your children to “Spritzers” camp) by saying “I don’t get involved in politics”, you are going to discover that this is not simply a case of two sides disputing over a piece of property (which is meant to help you and your children in the summer months), this goes much deeper then that, Mesira to the worse degree.
In time all will be exposed, there will be no excuse of “oh, I did not know”.
Added:(March, 8th, 2009) After reading thorough stacks of material on this case, I have come to a conclusion, that in essence the only thing I would have really needed (to make a case against Spritzer) is this Verdict and PMM. Meaning: if I was to just make a site posting this Verdict, it would be enough . If you really want to get a true picture of what went on, I advice to read this verdict more then onc
Read and come to your own conclusion!
יראה העם וישפוט
Short Version of Judge Glasser Final Verdict Against Yaakov Spritzer
On May 6, 1997, the plaintiffs, a not-for-profit Corporation and Yaakov Spritzer, filed a complaint against seven named defendants consisting of 167 paragraphs extending over 50 pages and asserting eleven claims as follows: I) RICO, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1962(b); II) RICO, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); III) RICO, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); IV) RICO, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); V) Tortuous Interference with Contractual Relations; VI) Fraud; VII) Conversion; VIII) Unfair Competition; IX) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; X) Assault; XI) Intentional damages to property.To characterize the complaint as prolix, replete with hearsay and irrelevancies, would be charitable.
Plaintiff Spritzer was then called as a witness.
His testimony is revealing in several respects. A careful and critical reading of it corroborated in eloquent detail the testimony of Shmuel and Mendel to the effect that Spritzer arrogated to himself the management of the Corporation. His direct testimony is consistent with the testimony of the prior three defendants…
Most revealing, if not disturbing, was the testimony elicited from Spritzer upon cross- examination,….
A careful examination of the returns for the years 1996-1998 give rise to questions to which answers that were less than satisfactory were offered by Spritzer.
As has already been indicated, the proceeding was stayed from the conclusion of the testimony on October 31st, 2001, until May 13th, 2002, when the stay required by the filing of the bankruptcy petition was lifted and the direct testimony of Spritzer was resumed.
Returning to the “Miscellaneous Statements”…
On Schedule D, Spritzer is listed as a secured creditor in the amount of $1,131,675, which is $131,675 in excess of the mortgage he holds for one million dollars and he surmised that the excess must be an unsecured loan. One can’t help but conclude upon reading his testimony about the schedules submitted to the Bankruptcy Court that the information they contain is of questionable accuracy and the record of monies received and monies disbursed represent a haphazard hodgepodge of speculation.
The conclusion that is compelled by his testimony is that the affairs of the Corporation were conducted by Spritzer as though it was his personal fiefdom with occasional allusions to board approval at meetings which are nowhere documented and by resolutions which were adopted and action taken only because Spritzer divines that they were.
The vigorous assertion by Spritzer that Goldman, Heber and Mendel breached a fiduciary duty they owed Machne Menachem by a fleeting involvement in Ohr Menachem upon which they embarked to provide a summer camp experience for some children of Crown Heights who would not otherwise have had it pales into insignificance when compared with the total disregard for the obligation of a director with which this record of self-dealing and financial legerdemain reeks.
Throughout his testimony, Spritzer asserted that meetings were held by him and Schreiber or by him, Schreiber and Spalter, at which corporate action was approved and yet neither Schreiber nor Spalter were called by him in support of those assertions.
The summary of the testimony as discussed above would be correctly interpreted by the reader as conveying an unequivocal skepticism of Spritzer’s testimony regarding prior approval and authorization of his virtually unilateral action on behalf of the camp and the Corporation.
I have previously alluded to the comparative breaches of fiduciary duty by Spritzer which, at the very least, makes his airing of them noisome.
The evidence established convincingly for this Court that what is alleged to be their abandonment was, instead, what I have analogized to be their constructive eviction by Spritzer.
The foregoing findings of fact drive the Court to conclude that Joseph Goldman, Mendel Hershkop and Shmuel Heber are still, as a matter of law, directors of Machne Menachem, Inc.
The foregoing constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court has considered the arguments advanced in the brief of the plaintiff Corporation which requires no discussion by the Court in addition to what has been written and which, the Court, in any event, finds unpersuasive.